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COMMENTARY
THE IMPORTANT CONTINGENCIES IN GAMBLING ARE SELDOM
CLEAR: AVOIDING THE RATIONAL CHOICE TRAP
Donald Hantula & Bess Puvathingal
Temple University
____________________

Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino ask how
clear the contingencies are in a standard gambling situation, and suggest that when contingencies are made clear, both people and pigeons will choose in a “rational” manner appropriate to the constraints imposed by the
prevailing contingencies. But, then they note
that human decision making is not terribly
rational or logical. Gambling regulations specify that parameters such as payout amount
and odds of winning be clearly communicated
to gamblers; gambling guidebooks, tip sheets
and websites are readily available. Yet, gambling abounds, and problem gambling affects
2.3% of the USA adult population. Nearly
four out of five US adults report having gambled. Of those, 12.2% of frequent gamblers
become problem gamblers while 4.3% become pathological gamblers. Pathological
gamblers report annual losses up to $5,000
(Kessler et al., 2008). Clearly, many people
are not choosing rationally. Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino suggest that answers may be
found in the gambler‟s head or in the gambler‟s social milieu. Or, in other words, we
could be rational, we may indeed want to be
rational, but the buzzing in our heads and
buzzing by our fellow creatures around us are
holding us back. And with that we step right
into the jaws of the rational choice trap.

Rational choice theory has dominated
economics and discourse about decision making for decades. Herrnstein (1990) points out,
rational choice theory may be an excellent
prescriptive theory (how we should behave),
but fails as a descriptive theory (how we actually behave). We argue that it also fails as a
prescriptive theory, largely because rational
choice theory ignores our evolved, naturally
selected decision processes, and privileges a
cognitive calculus as the central decision mechanism. Rational choice theory may be a better prescription for industrial automatons than
for evolved biological organisms. As long as
it is assumed that humans should or do want
to be “rational” in this classical manner, our
attempts to understand and ameliorate problem gambling will remain trapped.
Consider first the problem of probability.
Although probabilities involved in games of
chance are easily accessed, stated probabilities do not seem to exert much control over
our behavior. It could be the buzzing in our
heads that interferes with calculations. Or, it
could be that the rational representation of
probabilities in terms of odds is not how our
species has come to understand probability.
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have shown that
when decision problems are expressed in
terms of probabilities, we choose “irrationally.” But when the same problems are expressed as frequencies (occurrences over
time) we seem to get it right most of the time.
Why should a seemingly simple verbal adjustment make such a difference? Homo sapiens evolved learning about probabilities by
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sitting on a rock, watching prey gambol down
different sides of a valley, noting the number
that went in each direction, and choosing
where to hunt based on these observations.
We didn‟t perform the calculus of probabilities with sticks in the sand. Taking this analysis a step further, it may be that we are much
more sensitive to amount, and count, than we
are to probability; but ironically the contingencies of gambling are expressed in terms of
probability! Lyons and Ghezzi (1995) provide
some excellent field evidence here, showing
that wagers in state lotteries are largely insensitive to changes in probability but are very
sensitive to changes in amount of payout. The
contingencies may be clear to a calculator, but
not to most humans.
Consider second the problem of delay.
All real gambles are delays; the one-shot
stated probability type problems that seem
ubiquitous in the literature are minimally informative at best. No real person gambles
once, and never before or never hereafter,
based on stated probabilities, except in a
modern cognitive psychology laboratory.
Gambling is either used in the progressive
tense (indicates ongoing action) or perfect
progressive tense (indicates action that started
in the past, continues in the present, and will
be completed at some time in the future), implying repeated plays over time. Once time
enters the analysis, delay is only seconds behind. It is a good bet that delay discounting
may have much more to do with gambling
than we suspect. For example, consider the
„near miss‟ effect in video poker (in which
cards close to those needed for a win appear
in the display). These cards appear on nearly
every play, much more immediately than any
wins, and are implicated in the especially entrapping nature of this game (Parke & Griffiths, 2004). Does the „near miss„ serve as a
sufficient fairly immediate conditioned reinforcer to maintain high levels of play despite
heavy losses? As another example, the „illusion of control‟ and other „irrational‟ thinking
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found in gambling (e.g., self statements about
winning) may also serve as fairly immediate
conditioned reinforcers that maintain play.
Humans are not very sensitive to the passage
of time without the aid of external stimuli
(DiClemente & Hantula, 2003); thus it is not
surprising that the modern casino is bereft of
clocks, and windowless; like a trap.
We wager that answers to the puzzles
posed by problem gambling lie somewhere at
the intersection of amount, probability, delay,
and personal reinforcement history, not
trapped inside gamblers‟ heads. Indeed, it is
only when we stop viewing problem gambling as a costly violation of self-interest and
start viewing it as the product of a complex
interplay of naturally selected adaptations will
we successfully avoid the enticing jaws of the
rational choice trap.
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